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Abstract 
Unemployment in Europe is not only “too high”, it is also too different across countries that 
belong to a monetary union. In this paper we i) document this increasing heterogeneity, ii) try to 
explain it and iii) draw from our diagnosis indications as to the appropriate set of policies to 
reduce unemployment and labour market disparities. Our analysis suggests that the divergence 
in labour market outcomes across Europe is the by-product of interactions between, on the one 
hand, shocks of varying size and nature, and, on the other hand, country-specific labour market 
institutions. We argue that EU policy coordination and conditionality during the Great Recession 
and the euro area debt crisis did not properly take into account these interactions. We also 
propose a change in the European policy approach for fighting unemployment. 
Keywords: unemployment, conditionality, employment policies. 
JEL Classification: E60, J65, J68. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
El desempleo en Europa no solo es «demasiado alto», también es muy diferente entre países que 
pertenecen a una unión monetaria. En este trabajo, i) se documenta esta creciente 
heterogeneidad; ii) se trata de explicarla, y iii) se extraen algunas conclusiones acerca del 
conjunto de políticas adecuado para reducir el desempleo y las disparidades del mercado de 
trabajo. Este análisis sugiere que la divergencia en los resultados del mercado de trabajo en toda 
Europa es el subproducto de las interacciones entre, por una parte, las perturbaciones 
económicas de diferente tamaño y naturaleza y, por otra, instituciones del mercado de trabajo 
específicas de cada país. Se argumenta que la coordinación política de la UE y la condicionalidad 
durante la Gran Recesión y la crisis de la deuda en la zona del euro no tomaron en cuenta 
adecuadamente estas interacciones. Por ello, se propone un cambio en el enfoque de la política 
europea de lucha contra el desempleo. 
Palabras clave: desempleo, condicionalidad, políticas de empleo. 
Códigos JEL: E60, J65, J68. 
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1 Introduction 
Unemployment in Europe, notably youth unemployment, is not only unbearably high, it is also 
unbearably different across nations that belong to an economic and monetary union. It is 
divergent across countries (more so than across regions), so that talking about a European 
unemployment problem or even more so a European structural unemployment problem is 
highly misleading.  
In this paper we note that this heterogeneity cannot be accounted for only by the 
size or even by the nature of shocks experienced in the various countries. It is also largely 
unrelated to region-specific (and presumably sector-specific) evolutions within each country. 
The European unemployment divergence is largely to do with differences in labour market 
institutions across countries, notably the way in which these different institutions have reacted 
to shocks. Learning from these interactions between shocks and institutions is essential not 
only for devising structural reforms, but also for improving fiscal policy coordination in Europe.  
We argue that EU policy coordination and conditionality vis-à-vis highly indebted 
countries were poorly exerted during the Great Recession. On account of the incompleteness 
and the imperfection of economic and monetary union (EMU), there has been a lack of 
instruments to address the asymmetric effects of demand shocks across member countries. 
Even when some advances were made in the fiscal policy framework, too much emphasis 
was placed on the notion of structural unemployment, whether this was the non-accelerating 
wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU) or the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU). This turns out to be very risky since long-term trends and the long-lasting effects of 
the crisis on the relationships between macroeconomic variables make it more and more 
difficult to disentangle structural and cyclical unemployment, and, in fact, the several 
measures of structural unemployment, however defined, fluctuate too much over time to 
qualify as structural. 
Admittedly, there have been some improvements in the policy coordination 
framework of the EU, but conditionality over countries, whether or not they were subject to 
formal rescue programmes, was poorly exerted. Some key reforms were lost in translation, 
while others were enforced without taking into account their effects over the business cycle. 
We begin with some facts about country-specific unemployment trajectories and 
then move on to analyse the role played by institutions, shocks and the interactions between 
shocks and institutions in these trajectories. In this context, we look at outliers in Okun’s 
relationship and introduce some new microeconomic evidence on how firms adjusted to 
different shocks that has come from a new wave of a survey of European firms across 25 
countries, conducted by the ESCB’s Wage Dynamics Network. The final sections draw policy 
implications from our analysis, substantiating our negative views of the policy responses to 
unemployment during the crisis, and motivating a proposal for changes to the European 
policy approach for fighting unemployment.  
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2 Why unemployment is so high and divergent in Europe 
2.1 Some key facts 
Throughout the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009, unemployment in the United 
States was consistently higher than in the European Union. Five years down the road from the 
global crisis, EU unemployment is almost twice as high as in the United States (Chart 1a). In 
the 19 countries of the euro area it is actually more than twice as high as it is on the other 
side of the Atlantic. In Europe, unemployment is not only stubbornly high, but it is also very 
unevenly distributed across countries and population groups. There is clear evidence that 
since 2007 the dispersion of unemployment rates within the euro area has increased much 
more than in previous recessions; the gap between the average unemployment rate of the 
four euro area countries with the highest unemployment rates and that of the four euro area 
countries with the lowest unemployment rates is more than 15 percentage points. A similar 
comparison in the United States, between the averages of the ten states with the highest and 
ten states with the lowest unemployment rates, yields a gap of less than 5 percentage points 
(Chart 1b).  
Chart 1a 
Unemployment rates from 2000 to 2015: European Union, euro area,  
United States and Japan 
                     (percentages) 
             
Source: Eurostat. 
Notes: EA-19 refers to the 19 countries of the euro area, while EU-28 
denotes the 28 countries of the European Union. 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Jan 2000 Jan 2003 Jan 2006 Jan 2009 Jan 2012 Jan 2015
European Union (28 countries)
euro area (19 countries)
United States
Japan
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1534 
Chart 1b 
Cross-country (EU and euro area) and cross-state (United States) unemployment rates 
(percentages) 
Sources: Eurostat and BLS. 
Unlike the United States, Europe has not experienced a decline in participation rates, 
and, in fact, the level of labour supply in proportion to the working age population, which was 
higher in the United States than in Europe before the Great Recession, is now converging 
across the two sides of the Atlantic (Chart 2a). Also, in stark contrast with previous 
recessions, where soft-landing schemes to retirement were widely used by firms attempting 
to downsize, employment rates among older workers have actually increased in most 
European countries throughout the Great Recession and the euro area debt crisis (Chart 2b).1
  
 
                                                                          
1. The convergence in European and US labour force participation rates for workers aged 15-64 should not hide large 
differences in the degree of mobilisation of labour supply among older workers. Employment rates for workers aged 65 
or more are close to 20% in the United States and Japan, but lower than 10% in the EU. When the employment rate is 
computed for the population over 15 years of age, it is 8 percentage points higher in the United States than in the euro 
area.  
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Chart 2a 
Employment and participation rates in Europe and the United States 
(percentage of population aged 15-64) 
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: Data for the EU include only 21 countries because for these variables there are no homogeneous long-time series available 
for the EU-28.  
 
Chart 2b 
Employment rates among older workers in 2000 and 2013 
(percentage of population aged 55-64) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
A main driver of European cross-country differences in unemployment is youth 
unemployment, which stands above (often well above) 40% in southern Europe while 
remaining at single-digit levels in Austria and Germany. As shown by Casado, Fernández-
Vidaurreta and Jimeno (2015), during this recession job losses were highly concentrated 
among younger workers. Thus the explosion of youth unemployment was, unlike in previous 
recessions, not only related to a hiring freeze, but also to the heavy destruction of jobs held 
by young people, with the dissolution of temporary contracts, while at the same time 
employment rates among older workers were increasing (Chart 3).  
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Chart 3 
Changes in the probability of transiting between employment and unemployment  
between 2007 and 2012 for people of different ages, genders and education levels 
 in various European countries 
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These two distinguishing features of labour market adjustment in Europe since the 
Great Recession – the cross-country heterogeneity in unemployment rates, notably among 
young people, and the increase in labour supply – appear therefore to be closely interrelated. 
We will now discuss whether they can be attributed to institutional features or to differences 
within and between countries in the intensity and characteristics of shocks. 
2.2 Variation between countries vs. variation within countries  
Some preliminary indications as to the role played by shocks and labour market institutions in 
these developments can be identified by disentangling evolutions between countries from 
those within countries as typically institutions vary more across rather than within countries 
while shocks tend to be concentrated on specific regions and sectors. Given the high 
concentration of increases in job destruction and decreases in job creation among the 
younger cohorts, we focus on youth unemployment to perform this decomposition. 
In particular, we treat the EU as a single unit, and compute two well-known indexes 
of inequality (the Gini and the Theil indexes). They both show a noticeable increase in 
dispersion (inequality) of youth unemployment rates across EU regions throughout the Great 
Recession. The overall Theil index, for example, climbed from 13% in 2007 to 21% in 2013, 
an increase of eight percentage points. This regional dispersion can be broken down into 
variations within countries and between countries, according to the following formula2
 
:  
 𝑇 =  ∑ �𝑟𝑘
𝑟
𝑢𝑘����
𝑢�
�𝑚𝐾=1 𝑇𝑘 + ∑ �𝑟𝑘𝑟 𝑢𝑘����𝑢� �𝑚𝐾=1 𝑙𝑛 �𝑢𝑘����𝑢� �  
 
 
The first component, Twithin, expresses the weighted average of the Theil indexes of 
each sub-group of NUTS-2 regions, which is the dispersion rate of youth unemployment due 
to the variability within countries of youth unemployment rates at the regional level. The 
second component, Tbetween, captures inequality between EU countries, basically computing 
the Theil by using the countries’ mean values of regional youth unemployment rates. As can 
be seen from Table 1, from 2007 to 2013 the Tbetween increased from 8% to 18%. On the 
contrary, regional divergence within each country decreased, with a reduction in the Twithin 
from 7% to 4%. Thus, the growing dispersion of European youth unemployment rates 
appears to have a marked national dimension. Similar qualitative results arise when 
performing this decomposition on the overall unemployment rates. 
  
                                                                          
2. The notation is as follows: m is the total number of EU Member States, r is the total number of NUTS-2 regions, rk is 
the number of NUTS-2 regions in country k, 𝑢� is the average youth unemployment rate in the EU, 𝑢𝑘��� is the average 
youth unemployment rate of NUTS-2 regions in country k and Tk is the Theil index of country k.  
Twithin 
Tbetween 
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Table 1 
Measures of dispersion of youth unemployment rates 
Regional dispersion of youth unemployment 2007 2013 Variation 
EU regions (NUTS-2 level)    
Gini index 29% 37% 28% 
Theil index (total) 13% 21% 58% 
Theil within 7% 4% -48% 
Theil between 8% 18% 135% 
 
2.3 Okun in Europe 
In addition to labour market institutions, national (as opposed to regional) differences in the 
size of macroeconomic shocks may have been responsible for the increasing cross-country 
divergence in unemployment rates.  
A very crude way to assess the relative importance of institutions and shocks in 
unemployment dynamics is in terms of Okun’s law elasticities. Deviations from the overall 
euro area elasticity can be attributed to labour market institutions, while different country 
positioning along the same unemployment-GDP or employment-GDP elasticity can be related 
to the magnitude of the macro shock. Needless to say, part of the output fall itself can be 
attributed to labour market institutions (in their role as sources of shocks or in the 
transmission mechanism of shocks generated elsewhere), but, with very few exceptions that 
we highlight below, during the Great Recession the effects of shocks generated in the labour 
market on output are relatively second order. 
 
Chart 4 
Accumulated variations in unemployment and output between 2007 and 2013 
(log-differences)  
 
Sources: Authors´ calculations on Eurostat and OECD data.  
Note: The y-axis shows changes in unemployment rates and the x-axis shows the accumulated change in GDP 
throughout the period. 
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Chart 4 provides a visual representation of this admittedly rough decomposition. It 
plots the cumulated output (horizontal axis) and unemployment (vertical axis) variations over 
the period 2007-2013.3
 
 The message is rather clear. Just over one-half of the variation (about 
52%) in national unemployment rates is related to a different exposure to shocks per given 
beta coefficient. The cumulated growth rates in GDP during the period 2008-2013 range from 
almost -30% in Greece to more than +10% in Slovakia. Some features of the current crisis, 
from its different nature across countries (i.e. the presence and magnitude of housing bubbles 
in the pre-crisis period and the depth of financial markets) and the different policy responses 
(i.e. fiscal and external financing problems and bail-out issues), to the influence of the labour 
market in the transmission of fundamental shocks and lack of automatic stabilisers at the 
country level, explain the dispersion in GDP growth rates and, hence, in unemployment rates.  
The remaining 50% of the variation is not explained by GDP variation. As Chart 4 
shows, there are some outliers in the relationship between GDP growth rates and 
unemployment variation: Spain and Germany, most notably (also Finland and Slovakia, to 
some extent). Labour market institutions and employment policies, mostly (but not only) by 
determining the degree of labour hoarding in response to shocks, are likely to be behind this 
residual source of unemployment divergence in the euro area during the Great Recession. 
The fact that Okun’s coefficients turned out to be higher in countries with dual employment 
protection legislation (Chart 5) also confirms that cross-country differences in labour market 
institutions are important determinants of the divergence of unemployment in Europe. 
A simple decomposition can offer additional clues as to the sources of these 
differences in Okun’s coefficients and their relationships with labour market institutions. Given 
that 𝑢 ≈ −ln (𝑒) where u denotes the unemployment rate, and e the ratio of employment (N) 
to the labour force (LF), we have 
𝑑 ln(𝑁) =  𝑑 ln(𝑌) − 𝑑 ln(𝑌/𝐻) − 𝑑 ln(𝐻/𝑁) with Y being GDP and H being hours worked.  
                                                                          
3. The regression line involves a beta coefficient of -0.44 (t-statistics: -4.19).  
Chart 5 
Unemployment responsiveness to output changes in 
countries with different degrees of dualism 
(percentages) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on OECD data. 
Note: GDP variation is shown on the x-axis, while variation in unemployment is 
shown on the y-axis. 
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Then  
𝑑𝑢 =  −𝑑 ln(𝑌) + 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝐹) + 𝑑 ln(𝑌/𝐻) + 𝑑 ln(𝐻/𝑁)    (1) 
Chart 6 
Role of intensive, extensive and participation margins in unemployment  
to output response (2007-2013) 
(log-differences) 
Change in the labour force        Change in working hours per worker 
 
Change in output per hour worked 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on Eurostat and OECD data. 
Hence, the Okun’s ratio du/dln(Y) can be decomposed into a component related to 
the participation margin, a component related to productivity (per hour worked), and a 
component related to the intensive margin (hours worked per employee).4
                                                                          
4. We take OECD data for GDP, unemployment rate, labour force and GDP per hour worked and obtain hours worked 
per worker as the residual of the equation (1). 
 Clearly, EU 
countries behaved very differently in the way these three components accommodated the 
response to negative demand shocks (Chart 6). This heterogeneity in the use of intensive and 
extensive margins also points to the role played by labour market institutions during the Great 
Recession and the euro area crisis. 
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2.4 Some new microeconomic evidence on the nature of shocks  
Okun’s law coefficients control for the size of the aggregate shock, but they are silent on its 
nature, duration, sources and differential incidence across sectors and firms. Microeconomic 
evidence about sources of shocks to firms and their corresponding responses, in terms of 
employment, wages, hours worked and other adjustment mechanisms, is provided by an 
ESCB research network (the Wage Dynamics Network, WDN), which has conducted ad hoc 
surveys on firms. Its most recent wave, covering 25 European countries, was used to 
measure firms’ perceptions of the nature of shocks driving the Great Recession, responses to 
those shocks and the constraints imposed by labour market institutions on those responses.  
At the time of writing this paper, only very preliminary third-wave data from the WDN 
(and not for all countries that performed the survey) are available.5
Chart 7 
 Nevertheless, some 
interesting patterns, which will be further investigated when the whole dataset is compiled 
and harmonised, are emerging.  
Sources of shocks between 2010 and 2013 according to firms’ perceptions 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis:                                                                (x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis: 
percentage of firms with permanent effects of lower demand)                                                                 percentage of firms claiming debt refinancing problems as relevant) 
(x-axis: percentage of firms suffering a decrease in domestic demand; y-axis: percentage of 
firms suffering a decrease in foreign demand) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network Survey. 
Note: Data are third-wave WDN survey results and as such are very preliminary data. 
                                                                          
5. We are grateful to participants of the WDN network for allowing us to use these preliminary data, and to Samuel 
Skoda for his help in computing the statistics presented below.  
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First, as shown in Chart 7, there is a wide cross-country heterogeneity in the nature 
of the shocks, as reflected in the proportion of firms declaring that decreasing demand and 
financial problems were relevant or very relevant during the period 2010-2013. There are also 
noticeable cross-country differences in the duration of the negative demand shock, being 
perceived by firms as less permanent in those countries where more firms were experiencing 
decreasing demand. Across countries, there is also a positive association between the 
domestic and the foreign components of the fall in demand. The likelihood of a lack of finance 
being perceived as relevant by firms is also positively associated to the perception of a fall in 
demand.  
As for the responses to these shocks, there is a clear positive association between 
the proportion of firms suffering a decrease in demand, and the proportion of firms declaring 
that their base wages did not change during the 2010-2013 period (Chart 8a). A similar 
cross-country positive association is also observed with regard to the incidence of debt 
refinancing problems. This suggests that wage reductions could have been a way for liquidity-
constrained firms to borrow from workers.6
                                                                          
6. There is also evidence to suggest that credit-constrained firms increased markups as a way of raising internal funds 
(see Montero and Urtasun, 2014, and Gilchrist et al., 2015).  
 Also, given the magnitude of the demand and 
financial shocks, downward nominal wage rigidity seems to be more binding in southern 
European countries (France, Spain and Italy) than in eastern European countries (Slovenia, 
Latvia and Estonia) where internal devaluations took place in a less gradual fashion. Finally, in 
those countries where downward nominal wage rigidity was more binding, employment 
adjustments were more prevalent with significant differences between temporary and 
permanent employment in countries with dual employment protection legislation (Spain and 
Italy) and with fewer firms reducing employment in countries, such as Germany, that could 
rely mostly on other margins of adjustment (Chart 8b). 
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Chart 8a 
Wage responses to shocks between 2010 and 2013 
 
 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis: 
percentage of firms with lowered wages) 
 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s 
activity; y-axis: percentage of firms with lowered wages) 
 
Source: Third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network Survey. 
Note: Data are third-wave WDN survey results and as such are very preliminary data.  
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Chart 8b 
Employment responses to shocks from 2010 to 2013  (x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis: percentage of firms reducing permanent employment) 
 (x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s activity; y-axis: percentage of firms reducing permanent employment) 
 (x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s activity; y-axis: percentage of firms freezing new hires) 
  
Source: Third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network Survey. 
Note: Data are third-wave WDN survey results and as such are very preliminary data. 
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Hence, micro data suggest that differences in the characteristics of the demand and 
financial shocks hitting EU countries during the euro area crisis involved different adjustment 
mechanisms. While some countries seem to have had in place the proper institutions to deal 
with the shocks – Germany, for instance, could respond to a temporary shock by adjusting 
working hours – others were in a more difficult position, having to deal with permanent 
shocks, while also facing a credit crunch, implying a large reallocation of resources, and with 
labour market institutions not very likely to facilitate the needed adjustment. 
2.5 Institutions and shocks: learning from outliers 
The above macro and micro evidence points to relevant interactions between shocks and 
institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2002) that have yet to be fully understood. The role of 
these interactions can be characterised by considering the two key outliers in the Okun’s 
relationship, notably Germany and Spain. Without a doubt, the two countries faced shocks of 
different intensities and natures. Yet the asymmetry in the labour market response is quite 
striking. While in Germany adjustment along the intensive margin reduced the response of 
unemployment to the output fall, in Spain it is the decline in labour hoarding (a rise in 
productivity) together with a slight increase in participation and an initial increase in hours 
worked per employee that explains the rise in the unemployment rate.  
This comparison between Germany and Spain highlights the fact that three labour 
market institutions have been particularly important with regard to the characteristics of the 
macroeconomic adjustment observed in EU countries: i) subsidised short-time work, ii) the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, and iii) dualism in employment protection legislation 
(EPL). 
2.5.1 SUBSIDISING REDUCTIONS IN WORKING HOURS 
Germany activated a variety of instruments concentrated on the intensive margin in its 
adjustment to the Great Recession. First, it increased the scope of subsidised short-time 
work. Second, it used working-time accounts, essentially a scheme allowing firms to borrow 
from their employees. Rather than being paid for overtime worked, the employees earned the 
right to work fewer hours at a later stage. Third, there was yet another margin of adjustment: 
the introduction of mini-jobs increased the scope of multiple job holdings in Germany and this 
helped to prevent outright unemployment for many workers in the event of the loss of a 
primary (or secondary) job.  
Spain did not activate any such schemes. As a matter of fact, while in most OECD 
countries hours per worker reduced during the Great Recession, in Spain hours worked per 
employee actually increased between 2008 and 2010 (see Bentolila, Dolado, and Jimeno, 
2012). 
2.5.2 DECENTRALISING BARGAINING 
Germany decentralised wage setting in the early 1990s and was a pioneer in the introduction 
of “exit clauses”. It could therefore use plant-level “pacts for employment and 
competitiveness” to enable wage reductions rather than collective dismissals. At least up to 
2011, collective bargaining institutions in Spain were instead imposing wages established at 
“higher” (provincial or sectoral) levels to lower bargaining structures, i.e. plant-level bargaining. 
This de facto prevented wage concessions being traded for more employment security as in 
the agreements signed in Germany at the company level.  
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This lack of adjustment of hours and wages to negative shocks in countries with 
two-tier bargaining structures is well documented in previous waves of the WDN survey, in 
which firms were asked whether they would reduce labour costs by cutting hours, wages 
(either the base wage or bonuses) or employment (either temporary contracts or permanent 
contracts). The firms applying plant-level agreements on top of multi-employer ones adjusted 
employment more than wages or hours in response to adverse shocks, unlike firms where 
there was no collective bargaining at all. In fact, about 60% of firms involved in the two 
bargaining levels adjusted mainly employment, just as firms involved only in multi-employer 
bargaining did. Firms where bargaining presumably takes place only at the individual level 
instead adjusted mainly wages in response to adverse shocks. These findings are robust to 
controls for country, sector and size of firms. This suggests that plant-level bargaining in two-
tier regimes is inefficient in that it does not allow wage concessions to be traded for 
employment security, as in the case of stand-alone plant-level bargaining, concentrating all 
the adjustment on the extensive margin (Boeri, 2015).  
2.5.3 DUAL EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
Spain is the land of dual EPL, that is, the coexistence of two different segments in the labour 
market: employees with open-ended contracts and employees with temporary contracts. This 
coexistence generates larger fluctuations in employment than those observed in fully flexible 
labour markets (see Chart 5). Countries with a higher contractual dualism display stronger 
responsiveness of unemployment to output changes. The reason for this role of contractual 
dualism is that employers do not have to pay costs, even in terms of severance payments, to 
dismiss temporary workers as they can simply wait until contract termination and not renew 
their contract. Moreover, the very fact that all the adjustment is concentrated on temporary 
employment de facto insulates workers holding permanent contracts from the consequences 
of negative shocks.7
                                                                          
7. On the dynamics of employment under dual EPL see Boeri (2010) and Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010). 
 Large job losses in the temporary worker segment may well coexist with 
wage rises among the permanent contract segment. Something similar happened in the 
Spanish construction sector during the first phase of the Great Recession (2008-2010); while 
about one-third of jobs on contratos temporales were destroyed, workers holding permanent 
contracts continued to enjoy real wage increases. Needless to say, there is something 
fundamentally wrong with a labour market operating in this way. 
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3 What went wrong  
Let us summarise the evidence produced so far. High and unevenly distributed 
unemployment in Europe is not only the consequence of asymmetric shocks. It is true that 
shocks were of varying intensity and nature across countries, but even after controlling for 
these differences, the labour market responses appear to have been different across 
countries. Some countries used the intensive margin of labour market adjustment more, while 
others concentrated their response on the extensive margin. Some countries had bargaining 
structures that allowed for nominal wage cuts preventing mass lay-offs, while others could not 
use wage reductions as an alternative to dismissals. These institutional differences, in a 
context where the inactivity margin was not used – the labour supply of older workers was 
increasing, unlike in previous recessions – turned out to be very important in the differential 
rise in unemployment. Another important factor was labour market segmentation between 
temporary and permanent contracts, allowing wage increases to coexist with large 
employment losses, even within the same sector. 
This does not mean that policies aimed at bringing unemployment down should only 
address these institutional failures, learning from the best (and worst) performers, and 
forgetting about aggregate demand management. It only means that greater attention should 
be paid to the interaction between macroeconomic policies and institutions. Aggregate 
demand management should be better synchronised with institutional reforms if the task is to 
avoid excessive employment destruction. The optimal design of institutions is not 
independent of the underlying cyclical conditions. Some badly needed institutional reforms 
aimed at restoring competitiveness can have undesirable effects in severe downturns, and 
stabilisation policies can reduce the risk of these reforms backfiring. At the same time, labour 
market institutions themselves may have to be designed in such a way as to have counter-
cyclical properties, and this requires giving some fiscal leeway to countries in a monetary 
union hit by asymmetric shocks. 
In this section we first evaluate what appear to be the most relevant interactions 
between cyclical conditions and the optimal design of labour market institutions, also drawing 
on recent results from the literature. As aggregate demand management in a monetary union 
requires cross-country coordination, we will then consider the way in which fiscal policy 
coordination in the EMU takes into account cyclical conditions. Finally, we will consider how 
conditionality, vis-à-vis stressed countries, was used in the Great Recession and the ensuing 
euro area crisis. 
3.1 The timing of labour market reforms over the cycle 
There is a huge amount of literature on the effects of institutions on labour market outcomes 
(Boeri and van Ours, 2013). This literature typically offers insights as to the long-run effects of 
institutional reforms. Less is known about the effects of reforms at business cycle 
frequencies, notably their effects during downturns.  
One of the key findings of the literature is that during downturns it is generally 
preferable to increase wage flexibility as opposed to employment flexibility. The 
disemployment costs of minimum wages are indeed stronger during recessions, as the 
setting of the minimum wage may not internalise macroeconomic constraints when electoral 
cycles coincide with business cycles. Reforms of collective bargaining, notably those inducing 
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more decentralisation in wage setting have been found to increase the correlation of wages 
with labour productivity over the business cycle (Gnocchi et al., 2015). The fiscal costs of 
minimum wages and collective bargaining also tend to be particularly pronounced during 
downturns, as displaced workers draw unemployment benefits for a relatively long time 
before finding alternative employment. 
In contrast, reforms reducing employment protection tend instead to amplify the 
responsiveness of unemployment to output changes. This is particularly true when these 
reforms involve contractual dualism of the “Spanish type” (Boeri, 2010). Indeed, the presence 
of a stock of temporary jobs built up after a two-tier reform significantly increases the 
response of unemployment to output decline (Bentolila et al., 2012). Gnocchi et al. (2014) also 
find that reforms reducing EPL involve an increase in the volatility of employment. 
Furthermore, Casado, Fernández-Vidaurreta and Jimeno (2015), looking at worker flows and 
at the socio-demographic composition of these flows based on micro data from the 
European Labour Force Survey, find that during the Great Recession a higher proportion of 
flexible temporary contracts were associated with fewer transitions of young and middle-aged 
workers out of unemployment.  
As for unemployment benefits, their optimal level is inversely related to the magnitude 
of the elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment benefits. The latter is generally 
found to be much weaker during downturns. For instance, according to Kroft and 
Notowidigdo (2014), a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate almost 
halves the duration elasticity. This suggests that reforms should possibly increase generosity 
when the unemployment rate increases, and reduce it during expansions. Similarly Landais 
(2014) finds that the labour supply response to unemployment benefits is pro-cyclical, while 
Jung and Kuester (2014) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) suggest that unemployment 
benefits should be raised in the aftermath of a negative shock. Overall, it may be desirable to 
provide more generous insurance during periods of high unemployment and reduce benefit 
generosity during periods of low unemployment. This may require a rule-based system, with 
automatic clauses consistent with a fiscal budget balanced automatically over the business 
cycle (Andersen, 2014). 
A similar structure also seems appealing in pension systems. Reforms increasing the 
retirement age steeply while labour demand is declining may backfire as employers stop 
taking on new workers, preventing recessions from being used as cleansing devices 
(Caballero and Hammour, 1994), especially in countries where young workers are better 
educated than incumbents. Some flexibility in retirement age may be desirable when actuarial 
reductions are applied to people retiring before the normal retirement age. Clearly this 
flexibility would increase the annual government deficit, but would not affect the implicit debt 
of pension systems or the intertemporal budget constraint. By increasing public deficits 
during downturns and improving the fiscal balance later on, this actuarially neutral flexibility 
operates as an automatic stabiliser.  
3.2 The drawbacks of the EU fiscal policy framework 
The theoretical and empirical results summarised in the previous section suggest that 
countries badly hit by shocks should not be forced to consolidate immediately, and that the 
fiscal framework should give some fiscal leeway to reforming countries. An environment of 
very tough fiscal consolidation may be inconsistent with an acceleration of structural reforms, 
not only because such reforms may be politically more difficult, but mostly because they may 
not be desirable under an environment of strong fiscal contraction. 
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Table 2 
Conditions under the new EU fiscal framework 
(percentage points of GDP) 
   Required annual fiscal adjustment 
  
Condition 
Debt below 60% and no 
sustainability risk 
Debt above 60% or sustainability 
risk 
Exceptionally bad 
times 
Real growth < 0  
or output gap < -4 
No adjustment needed 
Very bad times -4 ≤ output gap < -3 0 0.25 
Bad times 
-3 ≤ output gap < -
1.5 
0 if growth below potential,  
0.25 if growth above potential 
0.25 if growth below potential,  
0.5 if growth above potential 
Normal times 
-1.5 ≤ output gap < 
1.5 
0.5 > 0.5 
Good times output gap ≥ 1.5 % 
> 0.5 if growth below 
potential,  
≥ 0.75 if growth above 
potential 
≥ 0.75 if growth below potential,  
≥ 1 if growth above potential 
 
Source: European Commission. 
EU macroeconomic policy coordination throughout the Great Recession was in clear 
contradiction with the principles stated above. With regard to demand management, fiscal 
policy was constrained by the way the EU policy coordination framework was designed and 
imposed. The fiscal framework at the EU level draws largely on the notion of the natural rate 
of unemployment, i.e. the NAWRU. In particular, in the presence of output gaps exceeding 
4%, temporary deviations from both the deficit and the debt targets are allowed (see Table 2). 
Output gaps are themselves estimated on the basis of the potential labour input, which is 
obtained as follows: Lp = WAPOP * LFPR * (1-NAWRU)*HW where WAPOP stands for the 
working-age population, LFPR for the labour force participation rate, and HW for hours 
worked per employee. The NAWRU itself is estimated applying a Kalman filter to a system of 
two equations estimated simultaneously. The first equation is the Phillips curve (which can be 
estimated with different specifications in different countries) linking wage growth to 
productivity and unemployment, while the second equation delivers the NAWRU itself. The 
measurement and estimation problems related to estimates of the NAWRU in the United 
States (a country with longer series and better measures of inflation than many euro area 
countries) are discussed in some detail in Staiger et al. (1997), Ball and Mankiw (2002) and, 
more recently in the context of the Great Recession, Watson (2014).  
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Table 3 
Dispersion of NAWRU estimates 
a) OECD 
  Coefficient of variation 
 Mean Overall Between Within Belgium 7.89 3.6% 3.7% 0.5% Czech Republic 7.38 9.7% 1.6% 9.6% Denmark 4.91 6.1% 4.8% 3.9% Germany 8.04 5.4% 4.8% 2.9% Ireland 6.4 20.8% 19.8% 7.7% Greece 9.88 6.2% 5.4% 3.3% Spain 11.42 14.2% 11.5% 8.7% France 8.59 3.0% 1.1% 2.8% Luxembourg 3.65 15.4% 8.5% 13.0% Hungary 6.85 9.6% 4.4% 8.5% Netherlands 3.76 6.5% 3.5% 5.5% Austria 4.57 10.0% 10.1% 1.8% Poland 15.31 14.9% 3.5% 14.5% Portugal 6.48 16.5% 13.3% 10.1% Slovakia 15.59 10.6% 2.5% 10.4% Finland 8.54 9.4% 3.8% 8.7% Sweden 6.84 14.2% 14.5% 1.9% United Kingdom 5.63 5.0% 3.0% 4.0% 
b) European Commission estimates 
  Coefficient of variation 
 Mean Overall Between Within Denmark 5.0 24.5% 3.3% 24.3% Germany 5.9 42.8% 3.7% 42.6% Ireland 9.9 38.5% 1.5% 38.4% Greece 6.1 44.4% 6.8% 43.9% Spain 11.4 36.1% 3.9% 35.9% France 7.6 30.1% 2.9% 30.0% Italy 8.1 18.3% 3.6% 18.0% Netherlands 4.9 34.1% 6.6% 33.5% Austria 2.8 39.5% 1.6% 39.5% Portugal 5.8 19.7% 2.0% 19.6% Finland 6.8 50.1% 2.2% 50.0% Sweden 3.6 59.4% 11.2% 58.4% United Kingdom 6.7 31.9% 0.8% 31.8%  
Source: Authors’ calculations on OECD and European Commission data. 
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Table 3 provides a synthetic measure of the dispersion in the estimates of the 
NAWRU provided by the OECD. In particular, we decompose the total variance in two 
components – one that is related to time variation within any forecast round, and another that 
captures differences across forecast rounds. The message is quite clear: for some countries, 
including Ireland, Spain and Portugal, there are very large confidence intervals around the 
mean, even when only variation within the round (for given policies) is considered. Similar 
results are obtained by using the European Commission’s estimates (Chart 9). 
Chart 9 
NAWRU estimates for various euro area countries 
European Commission estimates, standard 
deviation across vintages 
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Needless to say, there is nothing natural about unemployment rates that appear to 
fluctuate so much over time, not only between vintages but also within vintages, for given 
policies. All this suggests that the output gap measures used in fiscal policy coordination are 
unreliable.  
Moreover, structural unemployment is also an elusive concept from a microeconomic 
perspective. The empirical implementation of measures of (inter-industry, occupational and 
regional) mismatch unemployment (Sahin et al., 2014) faces daunting problems of 
consistency and comparability as data on vacancy rates in some countries are meaningless. 
Skills mismatches are also rather poorly defined when allowances are made for the skill 
downgrading of significant portions of the workforce (for instance, first-generation migrants) 
and the fungibility of a more educated labour force with youngsters being overrepresented in 
the unemployment pool.  
But even supposing that it were possible to disentangle cyclical unemployment 
from structural unemployment and that unemployment in the EU was mainly of the 
mismatch type, strongly increasing labour demand would not be quite as harmful because 
now the enemy would be deflation and wage growth would remain subdued. In fact, if one 
takes seriously the hypothesis that Europe, given its demographic and productivity outlook, 
is bound to suffer from a permanent shortfall in demand (the so-called secular stagnation 
hypothesis), then “there is room for doubt about whether the cycle actually cycles” 
(Summers, 2014), and higher wage inflation would bring the economy closer to the full 
employment equilibrium (see Eggertsson and Mehrotra, 2014; Jimeno, 2015).  
In summary, cross-country coordination in fiscal policies would be better off 
taking the actual unemployment rates as a reference, rather than being based on 
unreliable and possibly meaningless estimates of structural unemployment or output 
gaps, whose association with inflation and other macroeconomic imbalances may be 
different in the current macroeconomic context than in the standard macro stabilisation 
manual.  
3.3 Bad conditionality and misguided reforms 
EU conditionality placed a great deal of emphasis on labour market reforms, which received 
much more attention than product market reforms. Even when the diagnostics of 
dysfunctional labour markets were right,8
                                                                          
8. See, for instance, Blanchard, Jaumotte and Loungani (2014).  
 formal or informal rescue programmes rarely 
addressed the main determinants of poor labour market performance. The key lessons 
from the international experience of labour market reforms were lost in translation. 
Recommendations from international institutions were translated into reforms that backfire 
during recessions, ignoring the issue of contractual dualism, overlooking best practices in 
subsidising short-time work, and not addressing the key issues related to the reforms of 
collective bargaining and pension systems. We offer below three examples, drawing on the 
Italian, Spanish and Greek experiences throughout the crisis.  
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Chart 10 
Youth unemployment and employment rates among older workers before  
and after the Great Recession 
(y-axis: unemployment rate (percentage of population aged 15-24), x-axis: employment rate (percentage of population aged 55-64) 
 
Source: OECD. 
Note: Data from before the Great Recession are marked in blue and those after the Great Recession in yellow. 
In the case of Italy, fiscal consolidation forced the government to reduce the 
duration of the income support schemes for the unemployed at the same time as a pension 
reform was increasing the retirement age. In the midst of a major recession, this left many 
older workers displaced during the Great Recession without the soft landing scheme that 
had been internalised in the collective dismissal agreement (the so-called “esodati” 
problem), forcing the government to adopt a number of ad hoc (and costly) measures to 
deal with this problem. As older workers are more protected than young workers, the 
phasing out of any escape route to retirement also helped concentrate even more 
employment adjustment on youngsters. While in normal times there is no “lump of labour” 
and youth unemployment generally declines as employment among older workers 
increases (blue symbols in Chart 10), increasing retirement age and phasing out any 
bridging scheme to retirement in the midst of a major recession may concentrate all the 
adjustment on young people (red symbols in Chart 10). 
In Spain, a strong case was made for wage moderation (as opposed to 
microeconomic wage flexibility). The request was also for a stricter control of the budget 
execution of regional governments and for more transparency, timeliness and detail in the 
publication of monthly and quarterly government finance statistics. In fact, during the 
execution of the financial sector rescue programme in 2012 the Spanish government 
implemented comprehensive labour market reforms to provide firms with more flexibility in 
adjusting their labour force by reallocating workers internally, reducing working hours and 
altering other employment conditions, modifying wages for incumbent workers and allowing 
for more decentralisation in wage setting. A pension reform aimed at slowing down the rise of 
pension expenditures was also carried out. Although it seems evident that these labour 
market reforms may have been instrumental in delivering faster wage adjustment and a 
realignment of competitiveness in the Spanish economy, they did not successfully address 
contractual dualism and only mildly affected wage flexibility at the microeconomic level. As for 
the pension reforms, they were far from guaranteeing the actuarial neutrality in pension 
systems that was needed to adjust the labour force smoothly in times of recession and very 
far from restoring the long-term sustainability of Spanish pensions.  
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Finally, in the case of Greece, the Memorandum of Understanding asked for fiscal 
austerity and welfare cuts to consolidate public accounts, and wage reductions to restore 
competitiveness. This was done by cutting the coverage of unemployment and health 
benefits, reducing the minimum wage by between one-third and one-quarter and 
increasing retirement age. No reference was made to measures to promote economic 
efficiency and enhance productivity. The imposition of these policies on an economy with 
such profound structural weaknesses as Greece exacerbated the social impact of the crisis 
by harming in particular the less protected segments of the population and spreading 
poverty in a country where levels of wage, income and wealth inequality were already high 
(Matsaganis, 2013). 
Overall, within the three cases reviewed above, the key policy actions were i) wage 
moderation, ii) reductions in severance pay and, more broadly, the strictness of 
employment protection, and iii) increases in retirement age. References to either 
contractual dualism or to schemes inducing more adjustment along the intensive margin, 
such as short-time work or working-time accounts, were either less emphasised in the 
recommendations by international institutions or “lost in translation” when national 
governments acknowledged these recommendations. The possibility of introducing 
actuarial reductions to early retirement rather than forcing a rapid increase in the retirement 
age was also overlooked, and, in any event, prevented by the objective of obtaining 
immediate reductions in public pension outlays. 
In summary, there are reasons to believe that labour market reforms were generally 
implemented without learning from the heterogeneity in labour market responses to shocks 
in the euro area, and not taking into account the fact that fiscal measures and labour 
market reforms that are effective in normal times may not be desirable during major 
recessions. 
3.4 Moral hazard 
A final lesson learnt from the recent experience is how to use the fiscal constraint as a device 
to induce institutional reforms. Relaxing the fiscal constraint during a recession was deemed 
to exacerbate moral hazard problems in a monetary union. A typical (and topical) concern 
when discussing the implementation of labour market reforms is indeed that governments are 
less willing to do so without being constrained by a strong fiscal restriction. However, our 
analysis suggests that this argument is ill suited for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost, the effects of structural reforms are not independent of cyclical 
conditions. Some reforms may be desirable only during upturns and would deliver higher 
unemployment than in a no-reform scenario during downturns. This is particularly the case for 
EPL, but unemployment benefit and retirement plan reforms should also be fine-tuned to take 
into account cyclical fluctuations. 
Second, the types of reforms that are desirable during downturns are typically 
those that involve higher public expenditure. This is the case, for instance, for the short-
time work schemes used in Germany to mitigate the effects of the Great Recession. Many 
countries, including the United States, also made their unemployment benefit systems 
more generous, a reform that is not within the realm of possibilities for countries forced to 
carry out a major fiscal consolidation in the midst of a recession. By the same token, 
flexicurity reforms that substitute employment protection (involving severance payments by 
firms) for unemployment benefits (paid out of social security contributions and general 
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government revenues during recessions) require some fiscal room, particularly during a 
recession. Finally, reforms operating on the intertemporal budget constraint, which is 
relevant for pension systems, are inconsistent with fiscal consolidation targeting the yearly 
public deficit.  
Third, although the institutional framework put in place in the EU to deal with policy 
coordination has been somewhat enhanced during the crisis, there is still a long way to go to 
make its implementation more efficient. A better way to exert EU conditionality is to go directly 
to citizens and promote best-practice institutions.  
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4 How EU conditionality can help governments reduce unemployment 
There is still a lot of ground to cover in improving labour market institutions in Europe, and 
supranational authorities have a crucial role to play in this reform process. The cross-country 
divergence in unemployment evolutions is not a reason to strengthen the country-specific 
dimension of employment policies. Quite the opposite; the difficulties faced by governments in 
introducing best-practice institutions highlight the resistance to reforms by powerful interest 
groups favouring the status quo.9
4.1 Towards positive conditionality  
 In this context, more active involvement of the European 
Commission in the design and implementation of labour market policies is essential. At the 
same time, these reforms have strong effects on income distribution and may require those 
losing out to be compensated. Thus greater involvement of the EU would be acceptable to 
governments of Member States only if it goes hand in hand with adequate funding from 
European employment programmes. This supranational funding, if well designed, could also 
lessen the institutional shortcomings of some of the countries and play a stabilising role 
across the euro area. As is the case with access to fiscal leeway, it is more about using the 
carrot than the stick.  
In order to establish other conditionality mechanisms that could operate without reducing 
the scope of structural reforms, we propose three such supranational “positive 
conditionality” schemes, as opposed to the negative conditionality used to date. These 
schemes are designed i) to be partial complements of national programmes, not 
substitutes for them, ii) to solve the moral hazard issue as access to the European 
programmes is conditional on accepting new rules for EPL, wage setting and entitlements 
to unemployment benefits, and iii) not necessarily to imply either large expenditures or 
permanent transfers across countries. 
Moreover, a key ingredient of our proposals is the partial and gradual introduction of 
individual accounts, so that the benefits of implementing the programmes go directly to the 
workers, rather than to governments, social agents and other intermediaries. And as a result 
of such benefits being fully portable across national jurisdictions, they would be perceived as 
EU-wide entitlements and would also reduce some barriers to transitory labour mobility, 
which could also play a role as a stabiliser in the event of asymmetric shocks.  
4.1.1 THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
Labour costs, including high and uncertain firing costs, are often singled out as the main 
reason why employers refrain from hiring workers under the regular full-time/open-ended 
employment contract. This is particularly true in the countries where EPL reforms progressed 
“at the margin”, not by changing employment conditions for the regular contracts, but by 
introducing other types of “atypical” contracts, usually either part-time or fixed-term contracts. 
The inefficient turnover generated by this reform strategy seriously impedes productivity 
growth (Bassanini et al. 2014; Boeri, Garibaldi, and Moen, 2015). 
Facing similar problems (and an acute pension funding problem), Austria successfully 
implemented an EPL reform in 2002 by introducing individual savings accounts. In the new 
regime, severance pay does not depend on the reasons for terminating the contract and is 
                                                                          
9. On this topic it is very enlightening to read Fornero (2013). 
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covered by the employers’ contributions (1.53% of the salary) into a fund. In the case of 
dismissal after three years of tenure, the employee can choose between either receiving the 
funds accumulated in their account or saving them for a future pension.10
The reform experience during the European crisis shows that no significant 
improvements were achieved in the reform of inefficient EPL or in the correction of labour 
market segmentation, even when EPL reforms were mandated under a formal rescue 
programme. We believe that an alternative strategy based on the Austrian system could have 
been more successful. 
   
Let us examine how it could work. The European Commission would design a new 
single open contract with severance pay gradually increasing with worker tenure, just like in 
the new open-ended contract introduced in Italy, effective since March 2015. The contract 
comes with individual savings accounts into which both employers and some European funds 
(Structural Funds combined with the European Social Fund) contribute. Employers get some 
reduction in severance pay obligations and some reduction in labour costs (as European 
contributions also play the role of deferred wage subsidies). Workers gain from more stable 
jobs (and from the wage subsidy). Additional European funding to be put towards active 
labour market policies or unemployment insurance could also be implemented through 
contributions to the individual accounts. 
4.1.2 THE EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMME 
The lack of automatic stabilisers operating at the EMU level has been evident throughout the 
crisis. At the same time, “solidarity” and the promotion of social and economic cohesion 
among Member States are explicitly stated goals of the European Treaties. Thus, 
unemployment insurance implemented at the central level could be an attractive 
development, insofar as it could deliver on both fronts (i.e. the absorption of asymmetric 
shocks and the promotion of economic convergence).11
Nevertheless, there is a simple way to overcome these problems – by making the 
unemployment insurance scheme available only to those countries that achieve substantial 
progress towards a better design of labour market institutions. As in the case of the 
European employment contract, the implementation of this scheme could be eased by the 
introduction of individual accounts that could make unemployment benefits portable across 
countries, complementing the national insurance schemes. This European unemployment 
benefit could also be operated in conjunction with the equal opportunity contract in order 
to improve employment incentives (Brown, Orszag and Snower, 2008) and introduced as a 
partial complement to national unemployment schemes. As shown by Dolls, Fuest, 
Neumann and Peichl (2014), with proper contingency and claw-back mechanisms this 
 However, current unemployment 
insurance schemes in many European countries are far from optimal as there is inadequate 
management of moral hazard issues on both sides. On the one hand, the search activity of 
insured workers may be affected by entitlements. On the other hand, the financing of benefits 
does not always make employers internalise the social costs of unemployment. Moreover, 
introducing an EMU-wide unemployment insurance scheme when labour market performance 
and institutions are as heterogeneous as highlighted in previous sections may be 
counterproductive.  
                                                                          
10. For more details, see Hofer, Schuh, and Walsh (2011).  
11. References to previous proposals along these lines include Delpla and Gourinchas (2014) and Claeys, Darvas and 
Wolff (2014). 
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European unemployment insurance scheme does not need to imply substantial permanent 
transfers across countries, while it does preserve some redistributive and stabilising 
properties.  
4.1.3 ACTUARIAL NEUTRALITY AND THE PORTABILITY OF PENSION RIGHTS ACROSS 
JURISDICTIONS 
Public pension systems across the EU differ substantially from one another. Some of these 
systems have recently been reformed to achieve long-term sustainability, while others are still 
accumulating an increasing and potentially explosive (implicit) pension debt. EU fiscal 
coordination should force governments to make this implicit debt explicit, at the same time as 
informing citizens about their future pension rights. One way to do this would be to require 
social security administrations to produce personalised pension projections that would be 
disclosed to all contributors along the lines of the Swedish orange envelope experience 
(Sunden, 2014). These projections could then be aggregated at the country level to produce 
not only projections of total pension expenditures, but also entire distributions of pension 
outlays for particular groups of individuals. This information is essential for evaluating not only 
the financial but also the social sustainability of public pension systems, hence the potential 
spillovers of pension reforms into other social transfer schemes.  
It would also be sensible to use these projections in fiscal policy coordination at 
the EU level, allowing for temporary increases in public pension outlays during recessions, 
provided that these increased expenditures are compensated by larger savings later on and 
that they do not have an impact on the overall pension debt. This would be an important 
step towards improving the cyclical properties of labour market and social policy 
institutions and enhancing the intertemporal and long-run dimension of the EU fiscal 
framework at the same time.  
In this context, reforms introducing a level of pensions which is at least compatible 
with self-sufficiency and actuarial reductions to pensions obtained before the retirement age 
would no longer be unattainable by countries facing adverse shocks. This flexibility in 
retirement age could soften the cost of adjustment to macroeconomic shocks while 
rejuvenating the workforce. The fact that differences in the age of retirement involve actuarially 
neutral adjustments also makes the full portability of pension rights across jurisdictions 
sustainable and intra-EU bilateral agreements among social security administrations more 
transparent. Workers could move across jurisdictions, cumulating pension rights that would 
be paid by the administrations where the contributions were collected, based on the country-
specific rules. Given the presence of actuarial reductions, differences in the retirement age 
across jurisdictions would not prevent this full portability, as they do not affect the long-term 
debt of the single national administrations involved.  
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5 Final remarks 
Unemployment in Europe is becoming more and more country-specific. Asymmetric shocks 
combined with cross-country institutional differences have resulted in highly heterogeneous 
effects on national labour markets. It is difficult to foresee a united Europe and a properly 
functioning Economic and Monetary Union with so much cross-country divergence in labour 
market conditions and very limited instruments to insure unemployment risks across 
countries. 
European supranational institutions throughout the crisis over-emphasised the 
realignment of external competitiveness by relying on wage reductions, not realising that 
these reductions are most costly when they have to be achieved by nominal wage cuts (given 
the low inflation rate), households are highly indebted, and governments had to reduce public 
consumption, investments and transfers to consolidate public debt. When structural reforms 
were implemented, either at the initiative of national governments or of countries under formal 
programmes, they focused on reducing the costs of dismissals and forcing downward wage 
adjustments in the middle of a recession, rather than on removing structural impediments to 
productivity growth in poorly regulated labour markets. The international institutions with the 
capacity to apply some of their own initiatives to change the orientation of reforms and 
employment policies (for instance the European Commission) did very little in this respect and 
failed to design new programmes at the supranational level. 
In this paper we offer some proposals to change this state of affairs, looking forward 
to an enhanced role for European supranational institutions in improving the functioning of 
labour markets. In this regard, we call for European employment policies to complement not 
substitute national policies in the areas of EPL, unemployment insurance and pension 
entitlements. They would be introduced under positive conditionality, offering different (and we 
believe more effective) incentives for national governments to introduce badly needed 
structural reforms. And, finally, they would target EU citizens rather than governments or local 
administrations or intermediaries, meaning they would be more transparent and socially 
acceptable.  
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